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Abstract: What marks the difference between humans and ani-
mals? At what point does a human become an animal and vice 
versa? What is the difference between human flesh and animal 
meat and reversibly, between human meat and animal flesh? 
Where is the line to be drawn between them, if possible? This 
paper seeks to problematize and rethink the long-established 
difference between humans and animals via Merleau-Ponty's 
notions of flesh and animality and Deleuze's notions of meat 
and the zone of indiscerniblility, as they are presented, respec-
tively, in The Visible and the Invisible and in the second and 
third courses on nature in Nature: Course Notes from the 
College de France—"Animality, the Human Body, and the Pas-
sage to Culture" and "Nature and Logos: The Human Body"— 
and in the fourth chapter, "Body, Meat, and Spirit: Becoming-
Animal," of the book, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation. 
In addition, Francis Bacon's paintings are used to illustrate the 
ambiguity and indiscerniblility between the human flesh and the 
animal meat. Suffice it to say, the clear-cut traditional distinction 
between a human animal and a non-human animal is called into 
question and is rethought through their corporeity rather than 
their intrinsic mental faculties. 
The flesh is not matter, is not mind, is not substance. 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
The Visible and the Invisible 
We study the human through its body in order to see it emerge as 
different from the animal, not by the addition of reason, but rather, in 
short, in the Ineinander with the animal (strange anticipations or cari-
catures of the human in the animal)... 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
Nature: Course Notes from the College de France 
Auslegung, Vol. 28, No. 2 
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Meat is the state of the body in which flesh and bone confront each 
other locally rather than being composed structurally. ... In meat, the 
flesh seems to descend from the bones, while the bones rise up from 
the flesh. ... Meat is the common zone of man and the beast, their 
zone of indiscernibility... 
Gilles Deleuze, 
Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation 
The Issue 
Humans are rational animals and all non-humans are non-ra-
tional animals. This is not the argument of this essay; it could well 
serve as one, but it will not. It was an argument since the time of 
Aristotle and also, it was the beginning of the mark of difference 
between humans and animals. And here it is a beginning of this 
paper with the opening epigraphs by Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
and Gilles Deleuze—reflecting on the ambiguity and indiscernibility 
between humans and animals, on the one hand and flesh and meat, 
on the other. Since the birth of philosophy, a wedge has been driven 
between humans and animals. According to the western philosophi-
cal tradition, humans are beings that are not animals in the strictest 
sense of the word. But then the question that follows or should 
follow from such a claim: If humans are not animals, then what are 
they? How are they to be distinguished from animals? What marks 
the difference between the humans and the animals? Is the mark 
of difference on either side of the difference itself? It is these 
questions that have led me to write this paper on Merleau-Ponty 
and Deleuze on the theme of animal difference. 
The goal of this paper is to problematize and rethink the differ-
ence between humans and animals through Merleau-Ponty's no-
tions of flesh and animality and Deleuze's notions of meat and the 
zone of indiscerniblility. To accomplish the goal of this paper, I 
begin by presenting an overview of Merleau-Ponty's negative on-
tology of flesh as it is presented in his last and unfinished book, The 
Visible and the Invisible. This, as we will see, leads us into com-
paring and contrasting Merleau-Ponty's notion of flesh with 
Deleuze's notion of flesh and meat. Then I present Deleuze's no-
tion of meat, which is articulated in the fourth chapter, "Body, Meat, 
and Spirit: Becoming-Animal," of his book, Francis Bacon: The 
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Logic of Sensation. Five paintings of Francis Bacon are used to 
illustrate Deleuze's notion of meat more lucidly, the paintings thus 
follows: Three Studies of George Dyer (1966), Study for Head of 
Lucian Freud (1967), Three Studies for Portrait of Isabel 
Rawsthorne (1968), Three Studies for Henrietta Moraes (1969), 
and Portrait of Michel Leiris (1976). 
Next, I explain the textual gap that lies between Merleau-
Ponty's last book, The Visible and the Invisible and his last three 
courses on nature and animal difference, which are compiled in 
the book entitled, Nature: Course Notes from the College de 
France. The reason for such an explanation lies in showing the 
development of Merleau-Ponty's later thought. After that, I give 
an extensive account of Merleau-Ponty's notion of animality, which 
is discussed in the second and third course, respectively, "Animal-
ity, the Human Body, and the Passage to Culture" and "Nature and 
Logos: The Human Body." Lastly, the convergences and diver-
gences between Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze on the difference 
between (human) animal flesh and (non-human) animal meat are 
put forward. Having said that, let us now turn to Merleau-Ponty's 
ontological notion of flesh. 
Merleau-Ponty's Negative Ontology: 
Flesh, between Differences as Neither/Nor 
In his last and unfinished book, The Visible and the Invisible1, 
Merleau-Ponty discusses the ontological notion of flesh. First it 
must be pointed out that Merleau-Ponty's ontology of the flesh is a 
"negative philosophy" or a negative ontology (VI, 179). A negative 
ontology is very similar to a "negative theology" (VI, 179). Nega-
tive theology posits that God is beyond the descriptions of human 
language and for that reason, God's being cannot be defined posi-
tively or as what God is, but only negatively or as what God is 
not. Analogously, flesh can only be described or be defined nega-
tively, however, flesh in Merleau-Ponty's ontology does not play 
the role that God plays in negative theology. If flesh is anything, it 
is not. Even though, the French word / 'chair translates in English 
as 'flesh,' Merleau-Ponty does not mean that it is the "soft tissue 
of the body of a vertebrate, covering the bones and consisting mainly 
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of skeletal muscle and fat" or the "surface or skin of the human 
body." 2 Flesh, as it is described in the fourth chapter, "The Inter-
twining—The Chiasm," of the book, The Visible and the Invis-
ible, is neither body nor mind, neither subject nor object, neither 
immanence nor transcendence, neither essence nor existence, nei-
ther consciousness nor object, and neither being-in-itself nor be-
ing-for-itself. To put it briefly, within the logic of neither/nor, flesh 
is inscribed as everything, hence, as nothing in itself. 
Flesh is not a construction of the human mind. That is why it is 
neither another philosopheme nor like another philosopheme such 
as "idea," "acts of consciousness," "states of consciousness," "con-
cept," "mind," "representation," "object," "thing," "properties," 
"transcendental subjectivity," "matter," "form," "image," "percep-
tion," "subject," and "meaning" (VI, 157-58; 167; 224). Further, 
flesh is not nocma, nogs is, or essence. As a matter of fact, it 
cannot be or become a philosopheme at all because "[t]here is no 
name in traditional philosophy to designate it" (VI, 139). The "it" 
refers to that which is termed "flesh," but any other word could be 
substituted for it that would better describe it because no one word 
exhausts or encapsulates what Merleau-Ponty labels as flesh. 
Merleau-Ponty presents the notion of flesh to dismantle or de-
center "the objectivist ontology of the Cartesians" (VI, 183). Flesh 
is asubjective and nonobjective. That is, it is neither something that 
is subjectively constructed nor something objectively instituted, it is 
something between them. If there is no one word that can exhaus-
tively and univocally define, describe, and explain what flesh is, 
then how can we understand what flesh is, if it is anything? 
Flesh is the differentiality of all things and non-things. It is the 
texture, the inter-fabric in which all things and non-things are wo-
ven. It is the "common inner framework" of everything there is 
(VI, 227). Since it is never presented as an object or subject in the 
world it can never be "a representation for a mind" (VI, 139). That 
is to say, it has no presence, and for that reason, it can never be 
represented. To understand it, it must be comprehended as the 
chiasmic differentiality between the differences (VI, 227). For 
Merleau-Ponty, the differential space (Vecari) "between" all the 
binary oppositions is more real than either one of the opposites. It 
is as if "two mirrors facing one another where two indefinite series 
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of images set in one another arise which belong really to neither of 
the two surfaces" (VI, 139). The differential space or spacing 
(J'ecart) between the differences is the atopic place where the 
subject crosses over the object, where immanence crosses over 
transcendence, where existence crosses over essence, where con-
sciousness crosses over the object, where being-in-itself crosses 
over being-for-itself, and so on. In a nutshell, it is the place of 
"integration-differentiation" between the chiasmic differences (VI, 
233). That is to say, if flesh is anything, it is the "fields in intersec-
tion" (VI, 227). Having addressed ideas central to Merleau-Ponty's 
notion of flesh, I now turn to Deleuze for a discussion on meat. 
Deleuze, Bacon's Paintings, and the Zone 
of Indiscernibility of Flesh—Meat—Bones 
Deleuze revisits the issue of flesh after twenty years of the 
publication of The Visible and the Invisible, in the fourth chapter, 
"Body, Meat, and Spirit: Becoming-Animal," of his book, Francis 
Bacon: The Logic of Sensation1. It must be noted that a year 
before the publication of Francis Bacon, Deleuze takes up the 
question of animal difference in Chapter 10, "Becoming-Intense, 
Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible...," of his book, A 
Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia4. However 
in A Thousand Plateaus, animal difference is understood via be-
coming and indiscernibility (/ 'indiscernabilite), whereas in Francis 
Bacon it is explicated through two supplemental motifs, meat and 
flesh. That is why, Francis Bacon is vital for our discussion. 
Even though Deleuze's usage of flesh intertextually refers to 
Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze does not use flesh in the same way that 
Merleau-Ponty has used it in The Visible and the Invisible. For 
Deleuze, flesh is "the bodily material of the Figure" (FB, 20). His 
use of Figure with a capital ' F ' is significant, which in French can 
either mean face or rhetorical figure of speech such as hyperbole, 
metonymy, metaphor, oxymoron, and so on. In French, you can 
substitute visage and figure for face, but in English, you cannot 
because figure does not signify a face. This is exactly what Deleuze 
suggests by using the word "Figure," that it is not a face, but a 
head, but more on the face later on. Deleuze's discussion of 
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/ 'viande or meat begins as a form of questioning of the line of 
demarcation between the human and the animal. For this reason, 
the two words that are significant for our discussion are I'chair 
and I'viande. In some languages, there are two separate words 
for / 'chair and / 'viande and in some, there is only one word that 
embodies both terms. For instance, I'chair in English means 'flesh,' 
and in German, 'Fleisch,' but Vviande in English means 'meat, ' 
and in German, 'Fleisch? In short, the difference can be heard by 
two different words in French and English, whereas in German, 
the difference remains inaudible in one word. 
Deleuze introduces the notion of "meat" to interrupt the dis-
tinctions between flesh and meat, on the one hand and humans and 
animals, on the other (FB, 20). But what is remarkable about 
Deleuze's notion of meat is that it is explicated through Francis 
Bacon's paintings. He uses Bacon's paintings to unfold what meat 
is, which ultimately leads to the blurring of the clear-cut distinction 
between flesh and meat and a fortiori, between the human animal 
and the non-human animal. As Deleuze says, "what Bacon's paint-
ings const i tu te is a zone of indiscernibility {zone 
d'indiscernabilite) or undecidablity between man and animal. 
Man becomes animal.. ." (FB, 20). I will explain the zone of 
indiscernibility later on. The way in which Deleuze attempts to 
articulate his notion of meat through Bacon's paintings is through 
the distinction between the head and the face. A face is "a struc-
tured, spatial organization that conceals the head, whereas the head 
is dependent on the body, even if it is the point of the body, its 
culmination" (FB, 19). In other words, the face is the expressive 
aspect of the body and facial gestures and expressions are formed 
because of the organized arrangement of the nose, the mouth, the 
eyes, and the ears, whereas the head is the uppermost part of the 
body. 
Further, Deleuze tells us that Bacon, as a portraitist, is not a 
painter of faces, but of heads (FB, 19). A portraitist usually cap-
tures smiles, facial expressions, or the face of the person but Bacon's 
paintings are paintings of "head[s] without. . . face[s]" (FB, 19). 
To illustrate the difference between the head and the face and the 
notion of meat and the zone of indiscernibility more lucidly, I now 
turn to Bacon's paintings. There are numerous paintings of Bacon 
Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze, and the Question Singular 25 
that articulate the distinction between the head and the face and 
the notion of meat, but for reasons of economy, I have only chosen 
the following five paintings, 5 which are mentioned in Francis Ba-
con: Three Studies of George Dyer (1966), 6 Study for Head of 
Lucian Freud (1967), 7 Three Studies for Portrait of Isabel 
Rawsthorne (1968), 8 Three Studies for Henrietta Moraes (1969), 9 
and Portrait of Michel Leiris (1976) 1 0. It is worthwhile to mention 
here that I have not followed the chronological order of the paint-
ings in my discussion. In the painting, "Study for Head of Lucian 
Freud (1967)," the face seems to be effaced or skewed. It fails to 
look like a face. As Deleuze elaborates on the techniques behind 
the ef-face-ment and de-forming of the face: "In fact, the face lost 
its form by being subjected to the techniques of rubbing and brush-
ing that disorganize it and make a head emerge in its place" (FB, 
19). The face in the painting looks more like a lump of fleshly meat 
rather than just flesh. Lucian Freud's facial features such as a 
nose, eyes, ears, lips, or cheeks, cannot be discerned and more so, 
the difference between the face and the head cannot be marked. 
It looks like a big head or a chunk of meat, rather than a face with 
a head. Also, the left side of the face seems to be demented, as if 
the bones have sucked in the flesh. 
In the painting, "Three Studies for Portrait of Isabel Rawsthorne 
(1968)," it seems as if the flesh is coming off of her bones. Nor-
mally, the flesh is on top of the bones, but in this painting, the ob-
verse is being manifested. The bones predominate the flesh, while 
the flesh is just hanging on top of her bones, which makes it look 
more like meat rather than just flesh. Flesh, for that reason, ac-
cording to Deleuze, is ancillary to the bones. Further, in the paint-
ings, "Three Studies for Henrietta Moraes (1969)" and "Three Stud-
ies of George Dyer (1966)," the skeletal aspects are prevalent. 
Their skeletal features outline their face. The flesh no longer seems 
to be primary. The flesh is descending, while the skeletal features 
are ascending. "In meat," Deleuze goes on to say, "the flesh seems 
to descend from the bones, while the bones rise up from the flesh" 
(FB, 21). Likewise, in the painting, "Portrait of Michel Leiris (1976)," 
the bones are piercing through his flesh in all directions, through the 
nose, the cheeks, the forehead, and the chin. The face is deformed, 
which gives him somewhat of a meaty look. 
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But what is common in all five of these paintings is the 
indiscernibility (Vindiscernabilite) between flesh meat 
bones, between the face the head, and between the animal 
the human. The question of the limits of human flesh and animal 
meat is raised: where are the limits to be drawn between the non-
human animal and the human animal? At what point does meat 
becomes flesh and vice versa? Their point of becoming cannot be 
pinpointed unambiguously. This is the zone of indiscernibility (zone 
d'indiscernabilite). The head emerges. The human becomes in-
human or the non-human. Flesh becomes meat. The animal be-
comes the human. Meat becomes flesh. The face loses its faciality. 
That is, the facial features become indiscernible. The distinction 
between the head and the face is blurred. Even the portraits of 
Michel Leiris and Isabel Rawsthorne strike me as very odd be-
cause portraits, normally, are suppose to enhance the picture not 
distort them. These portraits lack any kind of personality. There 
are no smiles. The faces do not even look like faces. As a matter 
of fact, they do not even look like humans. In short, Bacon's por-
traits, as mentioned previously, point to the indiscernibility between 
1) the head and the face, 2) the human animal and the non-human 
animal, and 3) bones and flesh and meat. The question surfaces 
again: Where is the line to be drawn between them? 
The lines cannot be drawn in a clear-cut manner (figure). For 
this reason, for Deleuze, human animals and non-humans animals 
are always in the state of becoming, as always indiscernible from 
one another. But this indiscernibility is manifested in Bacon's paint-
ings because of the becoming-movement between the flesh, the 
meat, and the bones. It remains indiscernible whether the figures 
in the paintings are just meat, flesh, or bones. It is also not appar-
ent or transparent whether the meat is on the side of the bones or 
on the side of the flesh. The meat lies between, on the one hand, 
the flesh and the bones and on the other, human animals and non-
human animals. Meat is "the common zone of man and the beast, 
their zone of indiscernibility" (FB, 21). Deleuze is interested in the 
zone of indiscernibility (zone d'indiscernabilite) because it un-
does any kind of hierarchy between, on the one hand, flesh and 
meat, and on the other, human animals and non-human animals. 
Meat interrupts the traditional reified labels, to be exact, humans 
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and animals. After explaining Deleuze's notion of meat, let us now 
turn to Merleau-Ponty's notion of animality, which is discussed in 
his book, Nature. This discussion, as we will see, leads us into a 
better understanding of the link between Merleau-Ponty and 
Deleuze on the notions of meat, animality, and flesh. 
On the Textual Gap between Merleau-Ponty's Later 
Works Nature: Course Notes from the College de 
France and The Visible and the Invisible 
A textual remark regarding Nature and The Visible and the 
Invisible must be put forward before I begin discussing Merleau-
Ponty's views on animality or meat. To talk about Merleau-Ponty 
vis-ä-vis Deleuze's notion of meat designates a difficult task. 
First and foremost, Merleau-Ponty, to the best of my knowledge, 
never uses the French word I'viande in his three courses on 
nature. Secondly, these courses on nature were delivered while 
Merleau-Ponty was still writing The Visible and the Invisible, 
which he worked on even long after the courses were delivered. 
And it is in The Visible and the Invisible, that flesh is presented 
as the solution—to use a word for lack of a better word—to 
traditional problems, even including the problem of difference 
between humans and animals (VI, 250; 138). So, in a two-fold 
bidirectional way, The Visible and the Invisible complements 
Nature, while Nature supplements it. Complements it by flesh-
ing out the ontological details that are not used and expounded in 
Nature and simultaneously, Nature supplements The Visible and 
the Invisible by adding an extra meaty dimension to it that was 
promised in Merleau-Ponty's last working note of the proposed 
plan for the book dated "March 1961": "I The visible, II Nature, 
III Logos" (VI, 273-74 neither the commas nor the emphasis on 
"II Nature" are Merleau-Ponty's). 
In the same note, Merleau-Ponty says, "Hence we do not 
begin ab homine as Descartes (the 1st part is not 'reflection') 
we do not take Nature in the sense of the Scholastics (the 2d 
part is not Nature in itself, a philosophy of Nature, but a de-
scription of the man-animality intertwining)" (VI, 274; my 
emphasis). This proposal of "man-animality intertwining," in The 
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Visible and the Invisible is precisely taken through the motif of 
"interanimality" of humans and animals in Nature: Course Notes 
from the College de France11 (NCF, 166; 189). Nevertheless, 
The Visible and the Invisible seems more reliable than the course 
notes on nature and animality because it reveals the problems 
that Merleau-Ponty was preoccupied with in his last years. But 
since The Visible and the Invisible was never completed, we 
cannot and should not predict how the text would have been in 
its finished product, and that is why it is difficult to say whether 
Merleau-Ponty would have return to the problem of animal dif-
ference through the notion of animality or flesh. Maybe he would 
have incorporated both in his ontology, since they both comple-
ment and supplement each other through and through. It remains 
indecidable. Regardless of the textual gap and the difficulties 
encountered in conducting this project, I embarked on this ven-
ture because there is a key link between Merleau-Ponty's notion 
of animality and Deleuze's notion of meat, which demands our 
attention. 
Merleau-Ponty and Animalite | Between 
the Human Meat—the Animal Flesh 
The human, the animal, the non-human, the flesh, the meat, 
there is no precise border between them. What is fascinating about 
Merleau-Ponty's lecture notes on nature is that he takes up the 
issue of the distinction between human animals and non-human 
animals in depth. Nowhere—even as early as his first book, The 
Structure of Behaviorn—does he take up thematically the prob-
lem of animal difference as he does in his courses on nature. The 
Phenomenology of Perception makes peripheral gestures regard-
ing non-human animals. As a further parenthetical remark, one of 
Merleau-Ponty's 1948 seven radio lectures 1 3 sheds light on the 
relation of human animals and non-human animals. These lectures 
were delivered three years after the publication of the Phenom-
enology of Perception. The order and the names of the titles 
were decided by Merleau-Ponty. The fourth lecture—"Exploring 
the World of Perception: Animal Life"—criticizes the modern con-
ception of non-human animals as machines. This lecture precedes 
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the discussion on human animals, "Man Seen from the Outside." 
These tangential notes are provided to remind the reader that 
Merleau-Ponty has not forgotten the question of animal difference. 
It is very much of a concern of Merleau-Ponty, even when it is not 
thematized explicitly in his texts. 
Before digressing into more tangential, parenthetical, and pe-
ripheral historical and textual marks and remarks, let us get back to 
our pivotal concerns. Merleau-Ponty engages in the issue of the 
distinction between the human animal and the non-human animal 
through the notion of animality (/ 'animalite). Merleau-Ponty plays 
upon the French word / 'animalite, which has many significations: 
(1) "The characteristics or nature of an animal," 1 4 (2) "The animal 
instincts of humans as distinct from their spiritual nature," 1 5 or (3) 
"Animals considered as a group; the animal kingdom." 1 6 An animal 
kingdom is "A main classification of living organisms that includes 
all animals (i.e. even humans)." 1 7 In the world, there are non-hu-
man animals and human animals, but this distinction, according to 
Merleau-Ponty, is not a clear-cut one. As Merleau-Ponty argues, 
"What exists are not separated animals, but an inter-animality (in-
ter-animalite)" (NCF, 189). The non-human animal cannot be dis-
tinguished from the human animal and vice versa because there is 
a blurred distinction between, on the one hand, the "animality in the 
subject" (NCF, 166) and on the other, the animality as "a collective 
animal" (NCF, 169). Inverting the traditional distinction between 
animals and humans that was based on the analysis of their 
intrinsic mental faculties Merleau-Ponty writes, "The differen-
tiation of the animal is expressed in a clearer way in its exterior 
surface than in its interior organization" (NCF, 187). As Merleau-
Ponty further explains in a different way in the second course, 
"Animality, the Human Body, and the Passage to Culture": 
We do not have the right to consider the species as a sum of 
individuals exterior to one another. There are as many relations 
among animals of one species as there are internal relations 
among every part of the body of each animal. The fact that there 
is a relation between the exterior aspect of the animal and its 
capacity for vision seems to prove it: the animal sees according 
to whether it is visible. This leads back to the same philosophi-
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cal considerations. Just as earlier there was a perceptual relation 
before perception properly so-called, so too is there here a specu-
lar relation between animals [non-human and human]: each is 
the mirror of the other. This perceptual relation gives an onto-
logical value back to the notion of species (NCF, 189, not 
Merleau-Ponty's italics). 
And as Merleau-Ponty, in "The Intertwining—The Chiasm," 
remarks in a remarkably similar way: 
There is vision, touch, when a certain visible, a certain tangible, 
turns back upon, the whole of the visible, the whole of the tan-
gible, of which it is a part, or when suddenly it finds itself sur-
rounded by them, or when between it and them, and through 
their commerce, is formed a Visibility, a Tangible in itself, which 
belong properly neither to the body qua fact nor to the world 
qua fact—as upon two mirrors facing one another where two 
indefinite series of images set in one another arise which be-
long really to neither of the two surfaces, since each is only the 
rejoinder of the other, and which therefore form a couple, a 
couple more real than either of them. Thus since the seer is 
caught up in what he sees, it is still himself he sees: there is a 
fundamental narcissism of all vision (VI, 139, long passage ital-
ics not Merleau-Ponty's). 
The passages, "each is the mirror of the other" and "two mir-
rors facing one another where two indefinite series of images set 
in one another arise which belong really to neither of the two sur-
faces" are underscored and must be noted and annotated here. 
The non-human animal and the human animal are but mirrors to 
and for each other, one reflects the other and vice versa. The 
human animal, in other words, is to be understood through the non-
human animal and the non-human animal is to be understood through 
the human animal and this can be done if what is between them is 
articulated, namely their ambiguity {I'ambiguite). As Merleau-
Ponty questions, "Where are we to put the limit between the body 
and the world, since the world is flesh?" (VI, 138). I believe, the 
reason why, even as late as The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-
Ponty does not make a clear-cut separation between the meat of 
the non-human animal and the flesh of the human animal is be-
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cause flesh and meat are not two kinds of entities, but rather flesh 
is all there is and is not. And this ontological notion of flesh is what 
lies between the human animal flesh and bones and non-human 
animal meat. The human animal flesh is a "remarkable variant" of 
the non-human animal flesh and vice versa (VI, 136). As Merleau-
Ponty accentuates, "It is by the flesh of the world that in the last 
analysis one can understand the lived body (corps propre)" (VI, 
250). To incorporate the notion of meat in Merleau-Ponty's notion 
of flesh, it can be said, the human animal meat is a variant of the 
non-human animal meat and vice versa. The non-human animals, 
like the human animal lived bodies are sensible-sentient "variants" 
of the sensible flesh of the world. 
I am vacillating between Nature and The Visible and the In-
visible because they both, as aforementioned earlier, complement 
and supplement each other in their explanations through and through. 
The human animal cannot be thought of in separation from its non-
human animal. As it is explicit also from the third course, "Nature 
and Logos: The Human Body": "Animality and human being are 
given only together" (NCF, 271). They both are variants of the 
same fabric, namely, flesh: "The Ineinander of animality-human-
ity = grasped in other living beings as variants" (NCF, 208). Ani-
mality, in human animals, must not be thought as a superimposable 
ingredient. As a side historical note, this is a clear repudiation of 
Aristotle's formulation of the human being in the Metaphysics as a 
"rational animal." The human animal cannot be simply divided into 
two compartments, rationality and animality. This is a form of re-
ductionism to which Merleau-Ponty was against since The Struc-
ture of Behavior. As Merleau-Ponty boldly puts: the "human can-
not appear in its qualitative difference by mere addition of reason 
to the animal (body)" (NCF, 214). The non-human animal is more 
than a bundle of meat and stimuli responses. Merleau-Ponty's de-
scription of the human animal as intertwined (Ineinander) with 
the non-human animal dismantles all traditional hierarchies between 
humans and animals. Animality and humanity are not abstract ideas, 
but each of them are, what Merleau-Ponty calls, a kind of 
"corporeity" (NCF, 208). And what connects and separates the 
human animal with the non-human animal and vice versa is not 
"reason" but their "corporeity." They are both intertwined within 
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flesh with each other as flesh through each other's flesh. "The 
human," Merleau-Ponty goes on to say, is "to be taken in the 
Ineinander with animality and Nature. ... Reciprocally, human 
being is not animality (in the sense of mechanism) + reason. And 
this is why we are concerned with the body: before being reason, 
humanity is another corporeity" (NCF, 208). 
A human animal is not a rational animal and a non-human ani-
mal is not an irrational animal or an animal without reason. This 
distinction, according to Merleau-Ponty, cannot hold any more. 
There is no hierarchy between a human animal and a non-human 
animal. Their relation is ambiguous. No one species is superior to 
another, even if one has rational capacity, while the other does not. 
Their ultimate difference lies not in their cognitive capacities, but in 
their corporeity. I stress this because the human only emerges "as 
different from the animal, not by addition of reason, but rather, in 
short, in the Ineinander with the animal [that is to say,] (strange 
anticipations or caricatures of the human in the animal)" (NCF, 
214). Here, it must be highlighted that Merleau-Ponty draws our 
attention to where the kinship lies between the non-human animal 
and the human animal, namely, in the traces of their "caricatures" 
in each other: the hands, the face, the structure of the face, the 
organization of the organs, the number of fingers, hands, and legs 
and so on (NCF, 214). The corporeal features blur the clear-cut 
distinction between the human animal flesh and the non-human 
animal meat. The animality that separates the human animal and 
the non-human animal is what also clings them together. "From [all 
of] this follows," Merleau-Ponty concludes, "the relation of the 
human and animality is not a hierarchical relation, but lateral, an 
overcoming that does not abolish kinship" (NCF, 268). 
Towards Understanding Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze 
In retrospect, Merleau-Ponty's analysis of animal difference 
presented in the courses on nature marks him as a thinker who 
was ahead of his time. Even early as 1942, he was occupied with 
the problem of animal difference. Deleuze, after Merleau-Ponty, 
revisits the problem of animal difference through his notion of meat. 
For both Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze, the solution, for lack of a 
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better word, to the traditional problem of animal difference lies in 
between the difference of animals and humans, rather than on 
either side of the difference. The difference, however, between 
their solutions lie in their philosophical notions. That is, Merleau-
P*onty addresses the problem of animal difference through the on-
tological notion of flesh and animality, whereas Deleuze tackles it 
via the notions of meat and the zone of indiscernibility. Like Merleau-
Ponty's notion of animality, Deleuze's notion of meat undoes any 
kind of hierarchy between flesh and bones and meat, on the one 
hand and human animals and non-human animals, on the other. 
The human (animal) becomes non-human (animal) and the (non-
human) animal becomes (human) animal. 
Even though Merleau-Ponty does not use the exact Deleuzean 
term, "l 'viande," to question the distinction between the non-hu-
man animal and the human animal, he does so through the notion of 
"l'animalite," suggesting the Ineinander between human animals 
and non-human animals. Unlike Deleuze, Merleau-Ponty explicitly 
questions the traditional formulation of the human being as a "ra-
tional animal" and dismantles it by undoing the reductionism at 
work. But Deleuze, in contrast to Merleau-Ponty, creatively through 
Bacon's paintings articulates his notion of meat to interrupt the 
normal way of thinking about non-human animal meat and human 
animal flesh. These nuances between Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze 
are noteworthy because they inform the audience the differences 
between their interrogative approaches and their indefinite conclu-
sions. But both thinkers are against any kind of arborescent struc-
tures or hierarchies. 
What marks the difference between animals and humans are 
not their inner mental faculties but their outer corporeities, which 
leads to the ambiguity (J'ambiguite) and the indiscernibility 
(/ "indiscernabilite) between the inside and the outside of, on the 
one hand, human animal flesh and non-human animal meat, and on 
the other hand, human animal meat and non-human animal flesh. 
At the end, I leave my audience with the problem of animal differ-
ence as a problem for further development and some words by 
Merleau-Ponty on the difference between the (human) animal 
[meat] and the (non-human) animal [flesh]: "The human and ani-
mal bodies are only homonyms" (NCF, 272). What are we to make 
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of this weighty, fleshly, and meaty remark? It is a question that 
leads to another question, without a final answer, thus leaving the 
problem of animal difference open to further interpretation... 
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